Lt. Blodgett assisted the CO of the Delphy, LCdr. Hunter, with navigation during the hours preceding the accident—how he testified to this fact is another matter. The authors of Tragedy at Honda must have found hidden evidence of what took place aboard the Delphy, to have arrived at their conclusion. They documented that around 2035, after requesting and receiving the reciprocal bearing of 168° from the Radio Compass Station, Point Arguello, Lt. Blodgett requested to slow to take soundings. He complained that the bearings have been erratic by a few degrees and that all of the bearings put the Delphy north of Point Arguello. LCdr. Hunter shrugged and glanced at the Commodore. Capt. Watson shook his head and said it wasn’t much use and that they probably couldn’t reach bottom. It would also spoil the engineering run.[9]

 

In a telephone conversation on 3May99 with Mr. Laurence F. Blodgett, son of Lt. Blodgett, it was revealed that his father spoke oftentimes of his navigation during the night of the wrecks. He stated that Lt. Blodgett knew they were in a dangerous situation, and did everything in his power to warn the CO, LCdr. Hunter, to no avail. Lt. Blodgett believed the radio compass bearings received by the Delphy showed the squadron was heading straight for the compass station, and that if they stayed the course, they would pile up on the rocks. He said LCdr. Hunter was able to convince Capt. Watson that the bearings were wrong because the squadron was south of Point Arguello, and that the course laid out by dead reckoning was correct.

 

During his testimony at the Court of Inquiry, Lt. Blodgett revealed that he participated in the navigation on 8Sep23 and joined Capt. Watson and LCdr. Hunter in the belief that the radio bearings received from Point Arguello, which informed them they were to the north of the station, were inaccurate. As a result, the President of the Court interrupted Lt. Blodgett to inform him that he was now a defendant, instead of a witness.[10] This was a surprise to all concerned. Lt. Blodgett attempted to protect his superiors by withholding testimony about his request to “slow and take sounding”. Testimony of this nature revealed before the Court of Inquiry would invariably ripple into the court martials of Capt. Watson and LCdr. Hunter and influence the findings and sentence.

The opinion of the Court of Inquiry was that the Delphy presented a curious case concerning their navigation. Confident in their own D.R. (dead reckoning) and discrediting the compass bearings because they considered them confusing, the attitude of mind of the Squadron Commander, the Captain of the Delphy, and the Navigation Officer of the Delphy, was one of complete assurance, at the very time when a doubtful situation had arisen. This situation arose between 8 and 9 P.M. and became particularly acute when the Delphy sent the signal, “We are south of Arguello,” and asked for a reciprocal bearing.[11]

 

In final argument at the General Court Martial of Lt. Blodgett, the JAG, LCdr. Leslie E. Bratton, former CO of the Stoddert, Destroyer Division 32, argued that the evidence showed that Lt. Blodgett was Navigator, and that he had not performed his duty properly. He even introduced testimony Lt. Blodgett gave at the Court of Inquiry which clearly stated that Lt. Blodgett was performing navigational duties on Sept. 8. No witnesses were called for the defense; Lt. Blodgett chose not to testify. After a short deliberation, the Court returned a verdict of acquittal.[12] However, Secretary Denby reversed the acquittal after LCdr. Bratton reviewed the record of trial and recommended reversal. In early 1924, LCdr. Bratton was transferred to Washington from service with the Battle Fleet in San Diego to act as Assistant JAG for the sole purpose of reviewing all records of trial of those tried by the General Courts Martial. An attempt to obtain Lt. Blodgett’s record of trial from the National Archives in Washington failed because the record was allegedly lost by the Navy and never turned over to the archives. However, after over five years of diligent searching and thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, on 18 Oct. 2004 a copy of Lt. Blodgett's record of trial was obtained from the Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Review Activity, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

 

The testimony given by Lt. Blodgett at the Court of Inquiry, concerning his role as Navigator on 8Sept23, led to his being named a defendant instead of a witness. That is why the Court concluded that there was “complete assurance aboard the Delphy, at the very time when a doubtful situation had arisen." The discussion to slow and take soundings, as reported by the authors of Tragedy at Honda, and probably not heard by the Court of Inquiry, indicates that Lt. Blodgett advised his superiors that a doubtful  navigational situation existed.

 

LCdr. Hunter took the stand to testify during his trial. He stated emphatically that he did all of the navigation on 8Sep23. He also testified in a similar manner as a prosecution witness in Lt. Blodgett's trial, except that he considered Lt. Blodgett to be functioning as his assistant navigator. During Lt. Blodgett's trial, the JAG tried unsuccessfully to prove that Lt. Blodgett was the navigator on 8Sep23, but failed. The Court fully acquitted Lt. Blodgett of the charge: Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty. LCdr. Hunter's testimony in both trials appears to be an attempt to clear Lt. Blodgett from being responsible for the navigation that took seven destroyers on the rocks. And in turn, Lt. Blodgett withheld any and all testimony before the Court of Inquiry and during Capt. Watson's and LCdr. Hunter's trials concerning his request—which was denied—to slow and take soundings before the fatal turn to 95° true.

 

Lt. Blodgett was a prosecution witness in the first General Court Martial, that of Capt. Watson. Immediately after, he was also a prosecution witness in the second General Court Martial, that of LCdr. Hunter. Lt. Blodgett was the accused and was tried by the third General Court Martial, conducted by the same seven-member Court which heard the first two trials. During the first two trials, when called as a prosecution witness, Lt. Blodgett was never asked directly by the JAG if he ever considered the situation dangerous enough to request to slow and take soundings. If he would have been asked, I believe Lt. Blodgett would  have chosen to tell the truth in preference to perjury.

 

What would have been the outcome of Capt. Watson’s and LCdr. Hunter’s trials if Lt. Blodgett testified for the prosecution that he recommended the Delphy slow and take soundings, as a doubtful navigating situation arose? No damaging testimony was presented by Lt. Blodgett to warrant being called as a prosecution witness. It is my opinion, that the JAG, LCdr. Bratton, arranged the scheduling of the General Court Martials, so Lt. Blodgett’s trial would follow Capt. Watson’s and LCdr. Hunter’s. By so doing, and by not asking Lt. Blodgett the question about slowing to take soundings, harmful testimony that would, no doubt, have an effect on the punishment rendered, was withheld in both trials.

LCdr. Bratton’s Role as CO of the USS Stoddert…

On 8Sept23, the Stoddert, under the command of LCdr. Bratton, requested two bearings during the time frame LCdr. Hunter testified in his court martial that it was difficult to obtain bearings from the U. S. Naval Radio Compass Station, Point Arguello. The Stoddert was sent a bearing of 326° at 2011 and 330° at 2032, both bearings indicating that the ship was north of Point Arguello.[13] LCdr. Hunter testified in his court martial that at 2012 he obtained a bearing of 326° from the Radio Compass Station.[14] The station log does not contain an entry showing a bearing of 326 for the Delphy (ComDesRon11) at 2012.

 

Problems were encountered in the radio room of the Delphy on 8Sep23. An entry after 1900 in the log at Point Arguello states that the Delphy was causing interference by not listening before transmitting their request for bearings. Additional information revealed that three of the five radio operators aboard the Delphy were down with seasickness. 

 

Were the remaining two operators on the spark gap transmitter proficient with Morse Code and proper operating procedures and were they in good health?

 

Shortly after LCdr. Hunter sent the required 2000 position report, which was based on the Delphy’s (D.R.) dead reckoning position to the Commander Destroyer Squadrons,  he ordered Lt. Blodgett to go to the radio room and get as many bearings as possible from the Radio Compass Station at Point Arguello.

 

Lt. Blodgett took it upon himself to call LCdr. Bratton via radio telephone and request that he contact Point Arguello for bearings. When bearings of 326° and 330° were sent at 2011 and 2032, respectively, to the Stoddert, the Delphy intercepted the bearings, and Lt. Blodgett called them up the voice tube to LCdr. Hunter on the bridge. According to the Radio Compass Station log, no bearings were requested by the Delphy (ComDesRon11) between 1849 and 2038 on 8Sept23.[15]

 

It was obvious that LCdr. Hunter was unaware of the origin of the bearings sent to the Stoddert and intercepted by the Delphy because, during Capt. Watson’s trial, LCdr. Hunter testified that he was “unable definitely to state this bearing—326° at 2015—because it was the one bearing of the day which appears not to have been intercepted by any vessel of the squadron except the Delphy.” He further testified that “when this bearing was plotted on the chart, it appeared manifestly in error, since in order to be on this bearing the ship would have had to be set to eastward about eight miles in two hours, which was almost impossible.”[16] 

 

According to the record of trial, after five more questions by the JAG, LCdr. Hunter testified in a different manner concerning the 326° bearing. “The next bearing received is the one I am uncertain about, exactly what it was. I do, however, know that the Stoddert received a 326° bearing at 2012, and we received ours about 2015.”[17] This exercise by Lt. Blodgett was an attempt to have another ship obtain bearings to assist in navigating when in a doubtful situation. LCdr. Hunter probably did not know that LCdr. Bratton received bearings which placed the Stoddert north of Point Arguello. LCdr. Hunter was too busy trying to justify his 2000 position report which should have placed him abeam Point Arguello light around 2025. And when it did not, he requested a reciprocal bearing stating that he was south of Point Arguello.

 

The Court of Inquiry approved of the actions of Cdr. Roper’s 32^nd Division and Capt. Tomb’s 12^th Squadron, which included intercepting bearings, or if that method proved inadequate, by taking bearings themselves even though it was against the rules.[18] This action pertained to LCdr. Bratton requesting bearings—the Stoddert was in the 32^nd Division. 

 

But did the Court know that Lt. Blodgett requested LCdr. Bratton to request bearings to assist the Delphy with navigation?

 

In the opinion of the Court no rules or regulations, no formal practice of guarding set radio waves, may preclude a Captain or Division Commander from taking every navigational precaution to safeguard his own ship or division, as was done by ships in the 32^nd Division and in the 12^th Squadron. He must risk rebuke instead, and must at all times be prepared to take the initiative and to use his own individual judgment. The Squadron Commander (Capt. Watson) erred badly, very badly in judgment, but his errors must not be allowed to creep down the line even at the risk of severe rebuke from the senior in command.[19]

 

The authors of the Tragedy at Honda came up with yet another observation. “One may wonder why it was that so many experienced and highly professional sailors not only could be caught in a predicament such as the Tragedy at Honda, but also why not a single soul on the bridges or in the chartrooms of so many destroyers seemed to have the slightest inkling that trouble was brewing.”[20]

LCdr. Bratton should have been a material witness before the Court of Inquiry, and not the JAG. There is also a possibility that he could have been named a defendant, along with Cdr. Roper, Commander 32^nd Division, for an act of omission. Instead, the Court of Inquiry recommended Cdr. Roper for a citation for his seamanlike ability and judgment. LCdr. Bratton should have requested to be excused from JAG duties when Rear Admiral Kittelle, Commander Destroyer Squadrons, Battle Fleet, appointed him, following a request from the Convening Authority, Admiral Robison. The Stoddert, under LCdr. Bratton, was navigating in accordance with Naval Regulations, while steaming in follow-the-leader fashion under wartime Destroyer Doctrine. Cdr. Roper and LCdr. Bratton were aware of the dangerous situation Squadron Eleven was in, but failed to warn them. When Capt. Watson ordered the fateful turn to 095 true from the Delphy, the 32^nd Division turned seaward at the pivot point instead. None of the ships of the 32^nd Division were damaged or stranded.

 

Ensign Sampson G. Dalkowitz, OOD aboard the Kennedy (flagship of the 32^nd Division) at the time of the accident, was quoted years later in the Tragedy at Honda. “It is always idle to speculate on what might have been, but to this day Dalkowitz believes that, had it not been for the bawling out the Division Commander had received earlier that day from the Squadron Commander, Roper would have voiced his doubts to Captain Watson and all ships of the squadron might have been saved.”[21]

 

The falling out between Capt. Watson and Cdr. Roper occurred when Cdr. Roper placed a radio call to Capt. Watson and requested permission to abandon the engineering run to pick up survivors from the Cuba, a Pacific Mail steamer, stranded off San Miguel Island since about 0400 on the same day. Watson, who had a streak of stubbornness of his own, kept on declining, and finally told Roper off in no uncertain terms. The Squadron, he asserted, was on an important engineering run to determine if 20-knots could be maintained over a stretch of many hours. The run would be executed. Period![22]

LCdr. Bratton’s Role as JAG…

LCdr. Bratton, the prosecutor in Capt. Watson’s general court martial, failed to obtain the testimony of Mr. Eugene Dooman, who served as Third Secretary in the American Embassy in Tokyo when Capt. Watson was Naval Attaché. Mr. Dooman was onboard the Delphy as a guest for the trip to San Diego. Mr. Dooman carried a leather valise which contained $3,000 in silver. It was stored in Capt. Watson’s safe. In a personal letter to Charles Hice, Mr. Dooman wrote that he heard the money was found after the wreck by salvagers, but could not be claimed without the probability of being called as a witness in the court martial, and Watson and his defense officer were afraid that the testimony might prove harmful to Watson, as Mr. Dooman was with him when the ship struck.[23]

 

Mr. Dooman also wrote an account of his eventful trip on the Delphy for the authors of the Tragedy at Honda. He stated that about 9 o’clock in the morning, Watson took him down to the Commodore’s cabin immediately beneath the bridge; and, except for intervals when he was engaged with his duties on the bridge or elsewhere, and when Dooman went out on deck to watch the squadron on anti-submarine and other exercises, they spent virtually the entire day in conversation in the cabin. The Washington Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armament had taken place during Watson’s detail in Tokyo as naval attaché, and it has been one of Dooman’s duties, as of course it had been Watson’s primary duty, to follow as closely as possible Japan’s naval policy.[24]

 

LCdr. Bratton introduced the Point Arguello Radio Station bearing sheet for 8Sep23 into evidence in Capt Watson’s and LCdr. Hunter’s trials. It was marked Exhibit 4 in Capt. Watson’s trial and Exhibit 3 in LCdr. Hunter’s trial. The exhibits were certified true copies of the original U. S. Naval Radio Compass Station, Point Arguello Calif Daily Log for September 8^th, 1923 by LCdr. Leslie E. Bratton. Sheet # 3 of the original document contains a relevant comment made by Radioman First Class F. H. Hamilton that was not included in the exhibits prepared by LCdr. Bratton: “A8C (Delphy) causing interference by not listening in before transmitting”.[25] This comment was entered in the log immediately after a bearing was transmitted at 1852. 

 

Was the comment intentionally omitted? One thing certain—the Court did not see a true copy. This may have been another reason why the Delphy experienced difficulty getting bearings—improper radio procedure.

 

LCdr. Hunter took the stand in his trial and testified that after he was ashore at Point Honda he walked south to within three-quarters of a mile of Point Arguello and did not see the light because of the thick coastal fog. 

 

Why did he walk at night to Point Arguello not knowing how far it would be and was he alone?

 

A letter written by Captain George M. Grening, U. S. Navy (Ret.) documents a story told by a Chief Radioman who was a direction finder operator at Point Arguello on 8Sep23.  He stated that a navy crew apparently under orders came to the Station to get the radio log book which contained the bearings given the vessels before they ran aground. Quite a fracas developed over their attempt. They never got the log book, because Radioman First Class F. H. Hamilton locked it up in the safe when he heard they were coming.[26] Hamilton was called as a prosecution witness in both Capt. Watson’s and LCdr. Hunter’s trials, but the JAG did not ask any questions about the attempt to get the radio log book.

 

Was LCdr. Hunter with the crew and did LCdr. Bratton know about the incident? The sentence would have been affected if the Court heard testimony concerning the radio log book—did the JAG withhold it intentionally?

 

On the date of the wrecks at Point Honda, LCdr. Bratton was the Commanding Officer of the Stoddert, one of the ships in column formation steaming to San Diego with Squadron Eleven. Capt. Watson was the Commander of Destroyer Squadron Eleven aboard his flagship, the Delphy, and one echelon higher in the chain of command above the 32^nd Division Commander. He was a “reporting senior” on the conduct and performance of LCdr. Bratton. Should LCdr. Bratton have been appointed JAG at the Court of Inquiry and all of the General Court Martials? Should he have been transferred to Washington after serving as JAG in the general court martials to perform the final reviews of the records of trial for the Secretary of the Navy? I think not to both questions. Additionally, LCdr. Bratton possessed relevant information concerning the accident and his testimony as a witness would have provided a much stronger case for the prosecution.

 

During the Court of Inquiry when Lt. Blodgett testified as a witness, he stated that he was participating in the navigation and that he shared the same views as LCdr. Hunter—not taking the bearings given that night by the Point Arguello Compass Station too seriously. He described how their dead reckoning led them to believe that the Squadron was south, and not north of Point Arguello. This testimony caused the President of the Court to inform Lt. Blodgett that he was involved in the Inquiry and is now a defendant.

 

LCdr. Bratton may or may not have known beforehand that the order in which the trials by general courts martial were conducted—Capt. Watson, first; LCdr. Hunter, second; and Lt. Blodgett, third—would have a bearing on the sentences imposed. Lt. Blodgett was a prosecution witness during Capt. Watson’s and LCdr. Hunter’s trials and withheld damaging testimony in what appears to be an attempt to protect his seniors. Their punishment was considered very lenient by the reviewing authorities, even President Calvin Coolidge. However, when Lt. Blodgett went to trial, his silence, and LCdr. Hunter's testimony as a witness that he was the navigator, convinced the Court that an acquittal was warranted.

 

No doubt, LCdr. Bratton prepared the general court martial trial against Lt. Blodgett based on Lt. Blodgett’s testimony before the Court of Inquiry. He attempted to prove that Lt. Blodgett was the Navigator on 8Sep23, but failed to do so. He even introduced Lt. Blodgett's testimony at the Court of Inquiry into evidence, which contained statements about navigational duties that Lt. Blodgett performed on 8Sep23.

 

Did LCdr. Bratton request transfer to the JAG office in Washington to perform the reviews for the Secretary of the Navy, Edwin Denby to recoup his losses? It can be speculated that when Lt. Blodgett’s acquittal was reversed by Secretary Denby, the books were balanced to some degree. Should a new trial with a different JAG and Court have been ordered, instead of a mere reversal of the acquittal? Since 23 sailors perished and seven destroyers were stranded, I think yes.

 

LCdr. Bratton appears to have enlightened LCdr. Hunter when he testified for the prosecution in Capt. Watson’s trial. When first questioned concerning the 326° bearing at about 2015, LCdr. Hunter stated that it was the one bearing that no other vessel in the squadron had intercepted. Then only a few questions later by the JAG, LCdr. Hunter stated that the 326° bearing was received by the Stoddert at 2012, and the Delphy received the same bearing at 2015. Was the record of trial tampered with since there is no entry for a recess of the Court, and did the Court recess for LCdr. Bratton to tell LCdr. Hunter about requesting and receiving the 326° bearing at 2015? How was LCdr. Hunter enlightened so quickly and accurately? LCdr. Bratton knew that this bearing placed the Stoddert and Delphy on a collision course with Point Arguello.

 

The Controversial 168° Bearing at 2035…

The circumstances surrounding the 168° bearing, which LCdr. Hunter was to have received from the Radio Compass Station at 2035, was not thoroughly investigated by the Court of Inquiry.

 

During the Court’s hearings, Capt. Watson’s defense counsel, Capt. Thomas Craven, examined one of the witnesses, LCdr. J. M. Ashley, Communications Supervisor of the Eleventh Naval District. Capt. Craven claimed three different persons copied the 168° bearing from the Point Arguello Station, and that LCdr. Hunter later saw a typewritten copy of it in LCdr. Ashley’s office. LCdr. Ashley responded that he was not familiar with those allegations.[27]

 

On 12 Sept23, four days after the accident, LCdr. R. E. Bell, Commanding Officer of the Kennedy, sent a Radio Compass Report of bearings from shore letter to the Commandant Naval Yard, Mare Island, California, and to the Commandant, Twelfth Naval District. This letter was sent via Commander Division Thirtytwo (sic); Commander Squadron eleven (sic); Commander Destroyer Squadrons; Commander in Chief Battle Fleet; and Pacafic (sic) Coast Communication Superintendent. The report listed all bearings intercepted by the Kennedy on 8 Sept23. It contained the 168° bearing sent to the Delphy at 2035 and stated that it was a reciprocal bearing.[28]

 

From the above discussion concerning the 168° bearing received at about 2035, it is obvious that since the report from the Kennedy, signed by the CO, LCdr. Bell, was sent to all officers in the chain of command, that someone would have been able to supply the defense with a copy to introduce into evidence. No document was introduced into evidence to substantiate the receipt of the 168° bearing by the Delphy. I obtained a copy of LCdr. Bell’s letter from the National Archives. Its origin was LCdr. Ashley’s office.

 

LCdr. Bratton did introduce the Radio Station Bearing Sheet from Point Arguello for 8Sept23 into evidence. It did not contain an entry at 2035 of 168° for ComDesRon11. It was introduced as Exhibit 3 in LCdr. Hunter’s trial.[29] In Capt. Watson’s trial, it was marked Exhibit 4.[30]

Lt. Blodgett testified as follows in Capt. Watson’s trial:

15. Q. What information had you regarding any bearing that was received by the Delphy at about 2035?

A. At 2035 I was informed by the Commanding Officer ---- I was informed by the Commanding Officer that at 2035 a bearing was received of about --- there was a bearing received at 2035 of 168.

 

16. Q. Do you know whether or not that was a direct or a reciprocal bearing?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief that was a reciprocal bearing.[31]

 

Then in LCdr. Hunter’s trial, two days later, Lt. Blodgett testified in a somewhat different fashion concerning the 168 degree bearing received at 2035.

 

90. Q. After the receipt of the bearings at 2035, 2039 and 2048, what if any instructions did the commanding officer give you with relation to obtaining of subsequent radio bearings?

A. The commanding officer desired that I assist him in getting all radio bearings possible, that I try and obtain as many from point (sic) Arguello from that time on as I could possibly get.

 

91. Q. What did you do as a consequence of carrying out these instructions?

A. I went to the radio room and remained there asking the chief radio operator if it were possible for him to get more radio bearings immediately, and as fast as radio bearings could be obtained, I had them sent to the bridge or took them myself as quickly as they came in.

 

Lt. Blodgett must have requested only one bearing after 2048, because only one was logged by Point Arguello to the Delphy—323° at 2058, two minutes before the order to turn to 95° true at 2100 was carried out. This bearing was disregarded just as all the others which placed the Delphy north of Point Arguello. In fact, the order from Capt. Watson to LCdr. Hunter to change course at 2100 was issued around 2050—any bearing after that time fell on deaf ears.

 

92. Q. What if any comments, did the accused make after 2000 with regard to the obtaining of radio compass bearings with relation to the sector that they might be in?

A. The only definite comment that I remember was after the bearing was received shortly after 2000 in which the bearing was about, I believe 326, when he had me send a message to Point Arguello, stating: “Please send reciprocal, we are to the southward.”

 

Near the conclusion of his trial, LCdr. Hunter took the stand and testified that he personally gave the order to the radio operator to request a reciprocal bearing from Point Arguello. This contradicts with Lt. Blodgett’s testimony in the early stage of LCdr. Hunter’s trial. Neither the JAG nor the Court pursued the questioning on who actually requested the reciprocal bearing.  It was poor judgment and faulty navigation on the part of LCdr. Hunter to disregard all of the bearings that placed the Delphy north of Point Arguello in favor of the 168° at 2035 bearing, which was requested by stating that the Delphy was to the south. After all, it’s the responsibility of the Captain of the ship to know whether he is north or south of the radio compass station. It is my opinion that at this point in the trial, LCdr. Hunter wanted to take full responsibility for the navigation of the Delphy, because he knew that in Lt. Blodgett’s trial this fact would be established before the Court. Capt. Watson was not aware of the navigational problems until after the reciprocal bearing of 168° at 2035 was received and plotted on the chart. Between 2040 and 2050, Capt. Watson was informed of the situation by LCdr. Hunter, and because he placed full trust in LCdr. Hunter’s ability to get the squadron home safely, he gave the order to turn eastward into the Santa Barbara Channel to 95° true at 2100. Prior to this time, LCdr. Hunter did not know whether Capt. Watson would turn east into the Santa Barbara Channel or go seaward and southbound around the San Miguel Islands to San Diego. Not a single ship’s Captain or Division Commander knew which direction the squadron would take until the Delphy turned eastward at exactly 2100.

 

93. Q. What bearing did you receive as a result of this service message to Point Arguello?

A. To the best of my knowledge and belief the bearing that was received in response to that message was 168.[32]

 

Radioman First Class F. H. Hamilton, on duty at the Radio Compass Station, Point Arguello, at the time of the stranding, testified during cross examination in LCdr. Hunter’s trial concerning the 168° bearing.

 

26. Q. Two witnesses have appeared before this court and have said that the compass station at Arguello sent out a bearing at about 2035, is it not possible that that bearing should have been sent out and you have omitted it from the log you have before you?

A. That is a very hard question for me to answer, sir, for myself, I feel very confident that if she had asked me for a reciprocal bearing and I had taken one, I feel very sure I would have placed it in the log at the time.

27. Q. Is it possible that you may have omitted it inasmuch (sic) as two witnesses have testified under oath that such a bearing was received?

A.     Yes, sir, it could be possible.[33]

 

Whether accidentally or on purpose, Radioman First Class Hamilton did fail to log the 168° bearing at 2035. LCdr. Bell skipper of the Kennedy intercepted and logged it as a reciprocal. His report of bearings from shore logged on 8Sep23 was available from the National Archives.

 

Even if the bearing was logged by First Class Hamilton, it would not have assisted the defense of LCdr. Hunter or Capt. Watson. And it causes one to wonder why so much emphasis was placed on it since a bi-directional radio compass station can issue one of two bearings on request, but it’s the responsibility of the Captain of the ship to know which one to accept. LCdr. Hunter tried very hard to justify his position report at 2000, which was based on dead reckoning. An experienced navigator who taught navigation at the Naval Academy for three years, LCdr. Hunter could not  bear to send a corrected position report to Admiral Kittelle aboard the Melville, nor could he have reported that he did not know where he was. The request for a reciprocal bearing stating that the Delphy was to the south of the compass station was a last ditch effort to obtain a bearing in sufficient time to make a turn and avoid the San Miguel Islands which lie dead ahead. And all of this is happening while Capt. Watson was enjoying supper in his cabin below the bridge with Mr. Dooman, discussing the rewards for successfully completing a 20-knot engineering speed run and being awarded the big “E” for Excellence in Engineering. Capt. Watson was also expecting a promotion to Rear Admiral upon arrival in San Diego.

 

The opinion of the Court of Inquiry concerning the performance of the Radio Compass Station is noteworthy. “After considering carefully the testimony adduced, the Court finds nothing which reflects upon the efficiency of the radio compass installation. A mass of confusing testimony has been brought forward to prove that bearings may not be relied upon, but out of this testimony shines the clear fact that it was not the compass bearings sent to the Delphy which were wrong, but the judgment of the men who interpreted these bearings and who used them wrongly. All of the night of the 8^th of September, the 32d Division cruised to the north and south of Arguello light in a heavy fog working their way through the agency of radio compass bearings and the use of the lead.”[34]

 

In addition to the government documents in the National Archives, four books have been published on the Point Honda accident. No author has questioned LCdr. Bratton’s performance as CO of the Stoddert and later JAG during the Court of Inquiry and General Courts Martial. It appears to me that LCdr. Bratton should have been challenged off the Court of Inquiry and named a material witness. After reading all of the above mentioned material, I have concluded that the “white-wash” Secretary Denby feared most, came upon him. The U. S. Navy in Washington was not responsible for the conduct of Capt. Watson and LCdr. Hunter when they chose to practice faulty navigation and make bad errors of judgment. From then on, they had an inescapable personal responsibility for their conduct. Acts of omission and commission by any of the Battle Fleet officers involved in the accident, and its aftermath, lie in the realm of personal responsibility. In a nutshell, their conduct was not in the line of duty.

 

Did the accident contribute to the evolution of navigational instrumentation? Is there more to the Honda story, or is it just one single episode in naval history with no redeeming historical value? The answer is Yes to both questions. The accident highlighted the shortcomings of bi-directional radio compass stations; it changed the art of navigation to a science. In 1925, the Navy established a radio beacon at Point Arguello, so ships equipped with the new radio direction finding equipment could take their own bearings. And that was just the beginning, as we navigate with Ground Positioning Systems (GPS) which use radio waves and satellites to practically pinpoint our location anywhere on the planet. There are sailors who navigating Capt. Watson’s route along the coast who remarked, that if caught in a fog off Point Honda thick enough to cut with a knife, they could hit Santa Barbara Channel with one eye open. So much for technology!

 

When I read Cdr. Chris Nichols’ article “It’s A Great Time To Be At Sea” in the November 1998 issue of Proceedings, I felt assured that the right stuff is being taught to our Surface Warfare Officers and lessons have been learned since Point Honda. He stated “the best of Surface Warfare can be found in the wardrooms that are tight-knit groups where camaraderie is palpable, every mistake is a chance to learn—where the credo of the officers to the Sailors is ‘You are not put on this ship to make sure I succeed. I am put here to make sure you succeed’.”

Endnotes

 [1] Court of Inquiry, Finding of Facts, p. 1027.

[2] Court of Inquiry, Opinions of the Court, p. 1029.

[3] Charles A. Lockwood, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.) and Hans Christian Adamson, Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Tragedy at Honda, p. 217.

[4] Ibid., p. 213.

[5] Record of Proceedings of a General Court Martial, Capt. Watson, p. 150.

[6] Record of Proceedings of a General Court Martial, LCdr. Hunter, p. 125.

[7] Charles A. Lockwood, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.) and Hans Christian Adamson, Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Tragedy at Honda, back cover.

[8] Ibid., p. 216.

[9] Ibid., p. 44.

[10] Ibid, p. 176.

[11] Court of Inquiry, Opinions of the Court, p. 1031.

[12] Charles A. Lockwood, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.) and Hans Christian Adamson, Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Tragedy at Honda, p. 210.

[13] Elwyn E. Overshiner, Course 095 to Eternity, p. 237.

[14] Record of Proceedings of a General Court Martial, LCdr. Hunter, p. 108.

[15] Elwyn E. Overshiner, Course 095 to Eternity, p. 236-237.

[16] Record of Proceedings of a General Court Martial, Capt. Watson, p. 12.

[17] Ibid, p. 14.

[18] Charles A. Lockwood, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.) and Hans Christian Adamson, Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Tragedy at Honda, p. 193-194.

[19] Ibid., p. 194.

[20] Ibid., p. 207.

[21] Ibid., p. 83.

[22] Ibid., p. 81.

[23] Charles Hice, The Last Hours of Seven-Four Stackers, p. 69.

[24] Charles A. Lockwood, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.) and Hans Christian Adamson, Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Tragedy at Honda, p. 236

[25] U. S. Naval Radio Station Point Arguello, Calif. Daily Log for 8 September 1923. Hamilton on Watch. Sheet # 3.

[26] Charles Hice, The Last Hours of Seven-Four Stackers, p. 73.

[27] Charles A. Lockwood, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.) and Hans Christian Adamson, Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Tragedy at Honda, p. 177.

[28] Robert E. Bell, LCdr. U. S. Navy. USS Kennedy Report of Bearings for 8 September 1923, dated 12Sept23.

[29] Record of Proceedings of a General Court Martial, LCdr. Hunter, p. 54.

30] Record of Proceedings of a General Court Martial, Capt. Watson, p. 33.

[31] Ibid., p. 43.

[32] Record of Proceedings of a General Court Martial, LCdr. Hunter, p. 38-39.

[33] Ibid., p 59.

[34] Court of Inquiry, Opinions of the Court, p. 1034.