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Destroyers    Newspaper Articles    Magazine Articles    Books

Navy Department    Court of Inquiry    Courts-martial    Letters

National Archives    Dead-End

Introduction

This Point Honda Research subsite documents the research effort dealing with the naval shipwrecks, which occurred on September 8, 1923 at Point Honda, California—also known as Pedernales Point and La Honda, now Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Additional information on the Point Honda accident is available on the Point Honda Memorial web site www.pointhondamemorial.org.

When our labor at research for more than a year fails to produce new discoveries, it's time to close shop and face reality. There may not be any more new stuff out there. The web page entitled "Dead-End" is devoted to this end. If you are interested solely in those areas where questions still remain unanswered concerning the circumstances surrounding the Point Honda accident, click on this Dead-End link. Once there, you'll find background information based on research and a list of unanswered questions. If you know of or have found an answer to a question, please send an email and we'll spread the word on this site.

The following major topics appear in this section: Chronology of the Last Hours and Main Cause of the Accident.

The day after the accident, an aerial view of the scene was captured on a U. S. Navy Air photo—wing tips of a bi-plane shown—which is currently stored at the National Archives. Seven naval destroyers were wrecked at Point Honda within an area of about 500 yards.

Beginning in the foreground at the bottom edge, the photo shows the Fuller. From there and toward the center, the Woodbury's bow is shown touching Woodbury Rock. On a straight line path from these two ships, and heading toward shore, is the overturned hull of the Young—with only about two feet of her port side exposed. Still in a straight line path from these three ships, and closest to shore, lies the barely visible wreck of the Delphy. To the right of the Young, and closer to shore, stands the Chauncey in an upright position. Finally, in the upper left corner, the bow of the Nicholas appears to be heading seaward, while the dark mass to the right of the Nicholas is the S.P. Lee.

Between 2105 and 2115, on that day, seven destroyers out of a total of fourteen, steaming in column formation with the Eleventh Destroyer Squadron, Pacific Battle Fleet, on a 20-knot, high-speed, endurance test of their cruising turbines, were trapped in a web of sharp, volcanic spires along the rocky California coast and were stranded. 

The attached line drawing of the California coast, near the western entry into the Santa Barbara Channel, shows the Delphy's actual position at 2100, where she executed the fatal turn to 95° true and led seven destroyers to the bluff of Point Honda. 
 

Captain Edward H. Watson trusted LCdr. Donald T. Hunter to do the navigating for the entire squadron and to lead them home safely to San Diego. And probably because of this unquestionable trust, LCdr. Hunter was able to convince Capt. Watson that the Delphy was at or near the D. R. (dead reckoning) position at 2100 and able to turn safely into the Santa Barbara Channel. He believed navigating by dead reckoning—the "old-fashioned" way—was more reliable than by following radio compass bearings sent by "new-fangled gadgets" from a naval shore station .

The Destroyers page lists the fourteen squadron ships and the order in which they steamed in column formation, while the Photos page contains more detailed pictures of the accident. Two destroyers received minor damages, while five maneuvered away from danger. The estimated loss of Government property was $13 million. Twenty-three sailors perished in the worst, peacetime accident in U. S. Navy history.

Many years of research by this author produced numerous documents which would be wasted, if not shared. Future naval historians may choose to build upon the findings published on this web site, and hopefully, add new information about the accident, and the conduct of key personnel at the time.

The Associated Press (AP) was in the forefront reporting the accident in practically every major city in the country. The Newspaper Articles page of this site contains relevant extracts from articles which describe the accident in the early stages. It also contains extracts which reported the unusual currents in the Pacific before the accident, and the proceedings during the Court of Inquiry and the General Courts-martial. When warranted, the author's comments are included.

The Navy Department page shows an organizational chart at the highest level, dated July 1, 1923. At that time, Edwin Denby was the Secretary of the Navy under President Calvin Coolidge. This page also contains organizational charts of Destroyer Squadrons, Battle Fleet, Rear Admiral S.E.W. Kittelle, Commanding and Destroyer Squadron Eleven, Captain Edward H. Watson, Commanding.

Links to the Court of Inquiry and the Court Martial also appear on the Navy Department page. Copies of documents from these legal proceedings were obtained from the National Archives, with one exception, the record of trial case of Lieutenant (j.g.) Lawrence F. Blodgett, which failed to be delivered to the National Archives by the Navy Department. However, after over five years of diligent searching and thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, on October 18, 2004, a copy of Lt. Blodgett's record of trial was received by this author from the Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Review Activity, Office of the Judge Advocate of the Navy. Relevant extracts from these documents are included on these pages followed by this author's comments.

The Court of Inquiry, investigating the circumstances surrounding the accident, convened on September 17, 1923 in the Administration Building of the Naval Air Station on North Island, California, and questioned witnesses for 19 days. The Navy Department wanted the Inquiry to be a secret session—no press or public allowed. However, public opinion prevailed, and Secretary Denby was pressured to open the doors to the Inquiry. Newspapers all over the country carried articles covering the legal proceedings.

A seven-member General Courts-martial board began their proceedings—conducted at the Eleventh Naval District Headquarters in San Diego, California—against eleven defendants named by the Court of Inquiry, with the first trial, that of Capt. Watson, on November 5, 1923. The proceedings were also opened to the press and public.

One can only speculate why the Navy Department opened the Court of Inquiry and the General Courts-martial to the press and public when the records of these proceedings were classified for 50 years and not declassified until the 1970s. The Freedom of Information Act required the Navy Department to turn these records over to the National Archives and make them available to the public.

Once the newspapers published the results of the General Courts-martial, interest in Point Honda subsided. In early 1924, the final review by the Assistant Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy was completed, and the JAG of the Navy signed the endorsements of the record of trials by direction of the Secretary of the Navy. The Navy Department classified all legal documents and took custody for the next 50 years.

Years later, books and magazine articles began to appear as naval historians sought to find the missing links in the Point Honda accident. And practically every author made a contribution in the quest for the truth. 

The first magazine article I was able to locate was published in U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings in January 1957. It was written by Lieutenant Commander Richard B. Hadaway, U. S. Naval Reserve. The Magazine Articles page contains a list of articles and extracts which prompt comments from this author.

This magazine article may have stimulated the publication of the first book in 1960 entitled "Tragedy at Honda" by Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, USN (Ret.) and Colonel Hans Christian Adamson, USAF (Ret.). The Preface and Acknowledgements page in this book shows evidence of extensive cooperation with the Navy Department, while the authors gathered "long-forgotten incidents, charts, photographs, and records". Furthermore, the authors claim that the "entire story of that nightmare voyage" has never before been told.

However, the entire story has not been told. The Books page contains a list of the books which were published on this subject. Once again, key extracts are included which contribute extensively to the search for the truth. When applicable, this author adds comments.

This web site utilizes the technology of the 21st century to present the viewer a summary of the findings from numerous records, books, articles, personal letters and other documents. Each and every authors' contribution is appreciated. Every finding of fact and opinion is based on documents from the past. Testimony under oath during the Court of Inquiry or at the General Courts-martial takes precedence over any book, magazine or newspaper article which contradicts. However, when certain facts are missing—or deliberately withheld—from the record, this precedent does not apply. But, by and large, the testimony under oath during a naval legal proceeding is a sailors vow that the truth will be told.

Copies of personal letters between sailors and kin/friends were considered to be primary sources of information. However, if the lone survivor, Gene Bruce—97 years in 2004, who was a 16 year old sailor aboard the USS Chauncey, cannot substantiate the finding, it fails the test. One such letter has been challenged by Gene, and I leave it for the viewer to decide.

A private researcher was hired to search for documents at the National Archives in Washington, DC. Many pieces of correspondence and emails with these parties were generated. Important extracts are included on the National Archives page, most with this author's comments.

Finally, the viewer may send email comments on any topic from email links placed on numerous pages of this site. Kin, friends and interested parties are encouraged to send an email and volunteer to assist us in doing research. The only requirement is to know the definition of an accident and realize when personal responsibility for an accident begins.

Chronology of the Last Hours

For those viewers who lose patience with volumes of textual material on navigation and chasing bearings in the "Old Navy", the following table provides a chronology of major events which took place during the last hours before the fatal crash at Point Honda on Sept. 8, 1923.
 

Main Cause of the Accident

From: Operations, 12^th Naval District

To: Commander Destroyer Squadron 11

Steam schooner Raymond passed Point Arguello 2200 (less than an hour after the stranding) September 8 bound north. Experienced a strong south and inshore current from Arguello to Piedras Blanca. Coast and Geodetic Survey reports slight variation in tide. No other reports received to date.[iv]

News wire stories out of Los Angeles reported an unusual current around the channel islands based upon a report from the Captain of the Cuba, which wrecked on San Miguel Island in the early hours of September 8, 1923.

The Captain of the wrecked liner Cuba claimed that a mysterious change in the normal ocean current pushed him southward and east of his estimated position coming up en route to San Francisco.[v]

On September 4, 1923, four days before the disaster at Point Honda, the New York Times published an article from Los Angeles which described twenty foot waves along the California coast.
 

  Huge Swells Are Thought to Be Due to Earthquake in Japan

LOS ANGELES, Sept. 4.—Ground swells twenty feet high, larger than any in the experience of mariners at Los Angeles Harbor, struck the Southern California coast early today and were believed to have been the result of the earthquake and tidal wave which devastated parts of Japan.

The swells broke completely over the fifteen foot breakwater and carried away all loose objects, including a boat tender at the lighthouse and considerable lumber piled along the shore.

Naval observers said no storm of any size had been reported anywhere on the Pacific, and they thought the huge swells due to reaction on this coast from the Tokio (sic) catastrophe.

At Santa Barbara, Cal., the highest seas in years have washed the shores for the last thirty-six hours. Since yesterday afternoon six and eight foot waves have driven bathers back on the beach and at one time the tide came to the sea wall at the foot of the beach boulevard for the first time in several years.[vi]

On September 11, 1923, the Associated Press published a news release from Washington, DC, based upon attitudes and opinions of the Navy Department. Two paragraphs from this article pertain to the possible cause of the wayward current.

Unofficial description of the scene of the wreck and known peculiarities of the coastal area in which it occurred, led to the belief of some officials that a tidal disturbance of unusual force threw the destroyers far off their course, probably without the knowledge of the officers on board.

A possible connection between such a phenomenon and the recent Japanese earthquake was discussed. Records of the hydrographic office (in San Francisco) and reports of naval officers who have served extensively on the California coast agreed that the Santa Barbara section frequently experiences a coastward tide, attributable to no unknown marine factor.[vii]

On September 13, 1923, five days after the disaster at Point Honda, the New York Times published an article from San Francisco which described changes in the Pacific noted in California.

  Shifting Currents and Tidal Waves May
Necessitate Recharting the Coast 

SAN FRANCISCO, Sept. 13.—Within the past week ten American warships, a passenger liner and a freighter have come to grief off the coast of California as a result of oceanic changes on the heels of the Japanese disaster. Tidal waves that have smashed piers and breakwaters culminated on Wednesday in the wiping out of a Lower California fishing village by a huge wave.

The precise nature of the changes off the California coast are still unknown to those whose business is to record, chart and report such disturbances, but there have been at least two positive indications of a change in the nature of the Pacific in this locality.

First, there has been noted a definite and strong inshore set of the ocean current at that point.

Second, there have been unusual and dangerous waves, at time reaching points ten and twelve feet in excess of the highest normal waves.

The area of disturbance appears from the present reports of Point Arguello to beyond the American-Mexican border line.

Whether the oceanic changes on this side are the direct result of the upheaval in Japan, or whether they are due to a secondary disturbance in the bed of the ocean a comparatively few miles off the California coast, is yet unknown. Whether the bed of the ocean here has changed is also a matter of conjecture, and will be until new soundings can be made throughout the area of disturbance.

The Hydrographic Office, since the wreck of the seven destroyers at La Honda (Point Honda), has been receiving reports from masters of vessels, all of whom state that a strong inshore set of the ocean current has been noted in the vicinity of Point Conception and Point Arguello.

In the meantime mariners are taking unusual precautions when traversing coast routes south of the city.[viii]

While doing research on their book in the late 1950s, the authors of Tragedy at Honda encountered inconsistencies concerning the cause of a wholly unexpected current with a pronounced southeasterly inshore set.

In hunting around for the cause of such a phenomenon (inshore set), some mariners and oceanographers called attention to the great earthquake staged by Mother Nature in Japan just six days earlier. Almost 40,000 died, about 100,000 were badly injured, and more than 500,000 were made homeless by this terrible disaster. The enormous waves of energy released by the quake could easily, it was explained, have been transmitted across the ocean bottom and set up patterns of wayward oceanic currents. Some scientists held that this was quite possible. Others declared that it was utterly impossible.[ix]

On November 7, 1923, Lieutenant Commander Hunter, skipper of the Delphy and self-proclaimed navigator on September 8, 1923, testified at his trial by General Courts-martial concerning the navigational situation.

16. Q. If you have any other statement to make to the court relative to navigational work of the Delphy, please make it now.?  

A. I believe that the contributory factors to the loss of the Delphy were unusual and abnormal currents which could not be anticipated with the weather conditions as they were, and to the fact that a very thick fog extended not more than 500 yards from the coast line, when the visibility at the time of the change of course was a good two miles, which prevented us from seeing the danger and taking steps to avoid it.[x]

Lieutenant Commander Hunter taught navigation for two years at the Naval Academy prior to assuming command of the Delphy. On September 8, 1923, he navigated the Delphy by dead reckoning because he did not trust the radio compass signals sent to the Delphy from the station at Point Arguello. Several of the radio signals indicated that the Delphy was heading directly toward the station, although, the dead reckoning position showed the Delphy in safe waters.

When questioned about his judgment concerning these bearings at his General Courts-martial, Lieutenant Commander Hunter testified that he could not conceive that the ship had been set in eight miles in less than two hours.[xi]

All of the sources used in the research concerning “unusual currents” appear to verify that they existed along the California coast on September 8, 1923, and may have contributed to the disaster at Point Honda. Neither the Court of Inquiry nor the General Courts-martial which followed were able to establish a cause and effect relationship to explain the inshore current sets—nor did they try.

So here is the rest of the story—documented in The Tragedy at Honda.

The findings of the Court of Inquiry (recommended General Courts-martial be awarded to eleven officers) were greeted with general satisfaction by press, public and—not least—by Congressional politicians. The approval uttered by Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby was reflected widely by the economy-minded Coolidge administration. It was apparent that to certain factions in Washington, the real tragedy at Honda—the loss of seven splendid fighting ships and 23 irreplaceable lives—was of secondary importance. To them the matter of grave concern was that $13,000,000 worth of Government property had been tossed on the junk heap. For that, heads must roll on the sand.[xii]

But when the General Courts-martial returned only two convictions out of eleven, the mood changed considerably.

While the findings (two convictions and nine acquittals) dissipated the gloom that hung over the Navy, they created deep displeasure in Washington. The wholesale “hangings” that had been expected did not materialize to provide material for political campaigners. There was much talk about drastic Congressional changes in laws that deal with naval courts, to place greater legal power in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy.

Even (President) Calvin Coolidge—who seldom ventured an opinion on any subject, including the weather—observed that the “Court Martial has been very lenient with everybody.”

As is understandable, Secretary of the Navy Denby was much displeased with the nine acquittals. He believed that stern treatment should have been accorded all 11 of the defendants. He felt that the standards of naval discipline had been let down and that the prestige, performance, and morale of the service would suffer.[xiii]

It was the Navy Department’s next move. Commander Leslie E. Bratton was ordered to Washington and appointed the Assistant Judge Advocate to review the records of trial for the Secretary’s endorsement. Commander Bratton was also the Judge Advocate at the Court of Inquiry and the eleven General Courts-martial. On September 8, 1923, he was the skipper of the Stoddert—one of the ships of Division 32, Destroyer Squadron Eleven, which escaped the rocks at Point Honda.

After reviewing the records of trial, Commander Bratton recommended that the not guilty verdicts (acquittals) be disapproved. In early 1924, the not guilty verdicts (acquittals) were disapproved by endorsement placed on the court martial records (This author's comment: although, a copy of Lt. Blodgett's endorsement, prepared for signature—By direction on the Secretary of the Navy—was not signed by the JAG of the Navy or his Assistant, Cmdr. Bratton). This action was made public by the Navy Department with the statement noting that disapproval of the findings by the Secretary did not serve as a basis for re-trial of the cases, but was “simply an expression of the Secretary’s views of the Court’s action.”[xiv]

Once again, the bottom line took precedence. Years later, Captain H. O. Roesch, who was the commanding officer of the Nicholas at Point Honda, commented about the outcome of the reversal of his acquittal.

When all the acquittals were disapproved, we were all in the same boat. The principle effect of these reversals was that all the skippers were put in the position of having been responsible for the loss of their ships. This prevented us from submitting claims for the loss of our personal gear and equipment as did our junior officers.[xv]

Concern for unusual current on September 8, 1923 did not exist beyond Lieutenant Hunter’s trial. The Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby wanted heads to roll, and when he failed, he struck back by reversing the Court’s acquittals.

If the opinion of a Court of Inquiry was that the accident at Point Honda was caused by a huge tidal wave, which deposited the entire column of 14 destroyers on the rocks in one fell swoop, it would have been deemed an act of God by everyone in the chain of command, and no heads would have been called to roll. But since unpredictable, variable, deep, ocean currents caused by the earthquake in Japan, with hundreds of after-shocks days later, caused the loss of seven ships and 23 lives, an act of God does not apply—or should it have?

If you're interested in Point Honda and have some time on your hands, you may want to assist us by doing research in your community. Check your local newspapers and find out if they were publishing in September 1923, and have them archived. If so, search for all articles relating to the earthquake in Japan on September 1, 1923. Also search for any articles that cover the unusual currents on the west coast during the month of September. If you succeed, please send feedback via email. 

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Destroyers

Description

A total of 19 Clemson class destroyers—possessing a variety of descriptive names, i.e., four-stackers, four-pipers, and tin cans—formed Destroyer Squadron Eleven in 1923.  A photo of the USS Delphy (DD-261), Flagship of the Commander Destroyer Squadron Eleven, Captain Edward H. Watson, was available on the U. S. Naval Historical Center web site at http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-d/dd261.htm.

The photo shows the Delphy underway, circa 1920, before being fitted with an enlarged deckhouse to carry her after 4"/50 gun. Only one ship is shown; all others are similar, except for their destroyer (DD)  numbers.

The Delphy was built in Squantum, Massachusetts, and commissioned at the end of November 1918. Key specifications are as follows: overall length, 314' x 4 1/2"; length between perpendiculars, 310'; breadth on load water line, 30' x 11 1/2"; mean draft, 9' x 4"; displacement (normal) 1,215 tons; draft aft, 9' x 9 3/4"; speed, 33.91 knots.

The Delphy was equipped with four GE Curtis geared turbine engines—two high-power and two-low power—capable of delivering 27,000  horsepower, two propellers, and four Yarrow oil-burning boilers. Her total weight of machinery was 435 tons.

The four, tall smokestacks which served her four high-pressure boilers were mounted on the main deck. In addition to torpedoes and depth charges, the Delphy's armament included four, 4" guns and a 3" anti-aircraft gun.

When at full strength, her ship's complement consisted of a captain, seven wardroom officers, ten petty officers, and a crew of 114.

Seven Four-Stackers Stranded

On the morning of September 8, 1923,  Destroyer Squadron Eleven departed San Francisco Bay, bound for San Diego. At 0830, the squadron took departure from the light vessel steering various courses and speeds engaged in making practice runs in preparation for Short Range Battle Practice.

At 1130, the squadron  passed Pigeon Point on port beam distant  about two miles on course 160° true, standard speed 20 knots. This was the last definite fix on the journey south.

At about 1430, the squadron changed course to 150° true, Point Sur being approximately abeam but not sighted—reason unknown. 

The squadron engaged in simple tactical exercises of equal amounts to the right and left of the base course. At 1630, the squadron formed a column in the following order:

U.S.S. DELPHY (DD #261) Squadron Leader

U.S.S. S. P. LEE (DD #310) 33rd Division Flag

U.S.S. YOUNG (DD #312)

U.S.S. WOODBURY (DD #309)

U.S.S. NICHOLAS (DD #311)

U.S.S. FARRAGUT (DD #300) 31st Division Flag

U.S.S. FULLER (DD #297)

U.S.S. PERCIVAL (DD #298)

U.S.S. SOMERS (DD #301)

U.S.S. CHAUNCEY (DD #296)

U.S.S. KENNEDY (DD #306) 32nd Division Flag

U.S.S. PAUL HAMILTON (DD #307)

U.S.S. STODDERT (DD #302)

U.S.S. THOMPSON (DD #305)

The U.S.S. J. F. Burnes dropped out of formation during the afternoon due to a boiler problem.

At 2100, the Delphy—leading  the column of destroyers—changed course to 95° true without a previous signal to the squadron—to make the approach to the Santa Barbara Channel. The Delphy sent this signal to the next ship astern, the S. P. Lee, giving the new course, after the change of course was made. In five minutes, the Delphy was engulfed in a thick, coastal fog which cut visibility to zero. It was too late to halt the "greyhounds of the sea" as they sped to destruction.

Within ten minutes after the turn, seven destroyers—names shown in red print—were stranded on California real estate at Point Honda, and 23 lives were lost. The Farragut and the Somers managed to escape the trap with only minor damages.

Photos

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Newspaper Articles

Introduction

In the early days following the accident at Point Honda on September 8, 1923, the Associated Press (AP) was in the forefront with newspaper datelines from most major cities on the west coast. Copies of the first and second editions of The San Diego Union on the following day—Sunday, September 9, 1923—revealed only a partial description of an unfolding, major, naval accident. The early morning fog along the coast at Point Honda kept a blanket of speculation over an accurate list of casualties and the names of ships stranded on the rocks.

The following table lists several articles which were published on the Point Honda accident. Extracts from these articles and comments by this author are included on this web page.

 

It is my intent to repeat facts in Author's Comments whenever necessary to convey the best possible explanation of an extract. Because of the textual length of this page, a viewer may choose to read the extracts from only one or two newspaper articles. If this is the case, repetition will be justified. One who reads every extract and comment, in every article, will encounter this repetition and it may be boring. Kindly consider my purpose and read on.

Send your comments, suggestions and complaints to:

 webmaster@pointhondamemorial.org
 

Newspaper: The San Diego Union

Heading and Date: 25 Sailors Drown, September 9, 1923

Dateline: AP, Santa Barbara, Sept. 9.

Extract 1: Seven Destroyers Enroute to San Diego Are Wrecked. 
The dead were all trapped in their bunks on the Young when that vessel struck and were drowned when the craft capsized within two minutes after she had struck.

Although ordered by their commanding officer (Cmdr. William L. Calhoun) to remain aboard, many sailors jumped overboard in an attempt to get ashore.

Author's Comments: There is ample evidence that some sailors either jumped or fell overboard when the Young hit the rocks and before she turned over, because they were seen struggling in the water by survivors from other ships. There is also documentary evidence that cries from within the hull were heard by survivors hanging on the port side and waiting to be rescued. And days later, when divers used torches to cut into the Young, two bodies were found: Gordon J. Overshiner, Seaman Second Class, and an unidentified body.

This author can only speculate on the statement, if accurate, that men who jumped or even fell overboard, violated their commanding officer's order (to stick with the ship) as a unjustified attempt to place blame on the dead. The originator of this statement wanted to free Cmdr. Calhoun of responsibility for the deaths. And the implied conclusion would have been that the men died as a result of their own misconduct, and not in the line of duty.

The opposite took place. The Court of Inquiry stated in their opinion that the "men (three from the Delphy and 20 from the Young) met death by drowning and that their death was in the line of duty and was not due to their own misconduct." In addition, the same Court recommended that Cmdr. Calhoun "be brought to trial by a General Courts-martial on the charge: I. Through negligence suffering a vessel of the Navy to be run upon rocks." 

The newspaper article offers a contradiction: One paragraph leads the reader to believe that all who died were trapped inside the hull, while another paragraph states that many jumped overboard. Did those who jumped, die? Maybe some fell overboard when she was turning over?

Doing research into the accident at Point Honda? Find the answers to these questions or add your comments:

webmaster@pointhondamemorial.org

Extract 2: Three Survivors Reach San Diego.
Graphic details of the greatest naval wreck in history, a wreck which cost the lives of between 20 and 30 men and in which seven of the navy's finest destroyers piled on the rocks at Point Arguello were brought to San Diego tonight by three officers of the U. S. S. Delphy, the first ship to strike the rocks.

Lieuts. L. F. Blodgett, A. P. Mullinix and Ensign Robert C. Greenwalt stepped off the 6:30 train in clothes they had to borrow to make the trip. Lieut. Blodgett  suffered injuries to one of his legs and the other officers were badly battered in the crash.

Author's Comments: The details of the train trips from Point Honda, Santa Barbara, and Los Angeles to San Diego, are described by LCdr. Robert Greenwalt USN (Ret.) when he was 85 years old and contributing 14 pages to a book entitled "Honda Left Turn 095" published by Joe Silva in 1986.

LCdr. Greenwalt wrote that at 0130 on Sept. 9, a day after the accident, Capt. Watson instructed him to board the 0400 train to Santa Barbara and escort several personnel who were more seriously injured to the hospital. One of the injured from the Delphy was Lt. Mullinix, who suffered bad lacerations to his feet. He also mentioned that Mr. Eugene Dooman—Capt. Watson's guest aboard the Delphy—accompanied the detail as far as Los Angeles. 

After dropping off the casualties at the Santa Barbara hospital, minus Lt. Mullinix who received some treatment but wanted to proceed to San Diego, the trio—Greenwalt, Mullinix and Dooman—boarded the 0800 train to Los Angeles. When aboard, they met Lt. Blodgett, Head of the Navigation Department and Executive Officer aboard the Delphy, who was also traveling from Point Honda on his way to the San Diego Naval Hospital with a cracked knee cap.

Upon arrival in Los Angeles, Mr. Dooman called the Ambassador Hotel and made reservations. They took rubbing-alcohol baths to remove the fuel oil from their skin, and had their clothes cleaned and pressed. Their noon meal at the hotel was a "big steak and french fried potatoes, washed down with champagne". That same day, Lt. Mullinix, Lt. Blodgett, and Ensign Greenwalt boarded the 1500 train to San Diego and parted with Mr. Dooman.

Capt. Watson instructed Ensign Greenwalt to make his verbal report to the Commandant of the Eleventh Naval District, Admiral Louis Nulton—which he claims he did for two hours immediately after his arrival in San Diego. However, a San Diego news article on Sept. 10 stated Ensign Greenwalt was taken directly to Rear Admiral S. S. Robison, Battle Fleet Commander on North Island, to give a detailed report of the accident.

After Lt. Blodgett received treatment for his injury at the San Diego Naval Hospital, and according to his transcript of naval service, he was transferred to the Melville, Flagship of Rear Admiral Kittelle in Sept. 1923 and served until Feb. 1924. During this period, in addition to regular duties board the Melville,  Lt. Blodgett was a witness/defendant at the Court of Inquiry and a defendant at his General Courts-martial.

Of the three travelers, only Lt. Blodgett knew what took place aboard the Delphy, the lead ship in the column primarily responsible for doing the navigation for the entire squadron. The information Ensign Greenwalt was asked to communicate to the Commandant of the Eleventh District or the Battle Fleet Commander—whichever is correct—was lacking in specifics, because the Chauncey's experience differed considerably from the Delphy's.

One can only speculate that after Lt. Blodgett was treated at the San Diego Naval Hospital, he reported to the Destroyer Squadrons Headquarters, North Island, and awaited the arrival of the Melville, which remained at Point Honda for two days following the accident. He may have eventually told Rear Admiral Kittelle  and/or Rear Admiral Robison what took place aboard the Delphy, and having done so, was shielded from his immediate superiors—Capt. Watson and LCdr. Hunter.
 

Newspaper: The San Diego Union

Heading and Date: Special Train Bearing Survivors To San Diego; 23 Sailors Lost, September 10, 1923

Dateline: Oceanside, Sept. 10 (2:30 a.m.).

Extract 1: Seven Warships Enroute Here Pile Up On Rocks in Fog off Point Arguello. 
Nineteen of the missing men are from the Young. It is said they disregarded orders and jumped when ship capsized. Those who clung to the steep decks of the Young  were taken off.

Author's Comment: This author's comments in the preceding extract apply here. However, this article is more specific in what it is trying to convey. Whoever originated the information that the sailors who did not stick with the ship violated Cmdr. Calhoun's order were trying to free Cmdr. Calhoun from being responsible for their deaths. And as commented in the previous extract, the Court of Inquiry stated in their opinion that the "men (three from the Delphy and 20 from the Young) met death by drowning and that their death was in the line of duty and was not due to their own misconduct." In addition, the same Court recommended that Cmdr. Calhoun "be brought to trial by a General Courts-martial on the charge: I. Through negligence suffering a vessel of the Navy to be run upon rocks." 
 

Newspaper: Arizona Republic

Heading and Date: Death Toll Of Wrecked Destroyers Reach 29, September 11, 1923

Dateline: Santa Barbara, Calif., Sept. 10.

Extract 1: Official List Being Prepared; Tidal Wave May Have Been Responsible for Disaster.
Today it developed that the wrecking of the Pacific mail liner Cuba probably was indirectly responsible for the loss of seven destroyers and many lives about four hours after the Cuba struck. The destroyers, traveling in a heavy fog, mistook radio signals directing the destroyer Reno (attached to Destroyer Squadron Eleven) to the Cuba for instructions for them. The mistake was discovered only a few minutes before the Delphy, the first of seven to run aground, hit, and too late to save them. 

Author's Comments: According to David Grover, the author of a magazine article in Sea Classics, June 1993, the Cuba grounded off San Miguel Island, on the western tip of the Santa Barbara Channel, at 0430 on Sept. 8. Whereas the seven destroyers went aground between 2105 and 2115  on Sept. 8., more than sixteen hours later.

There is no record in the daily log of the radio compass station at Point Arguello to substantiate that the communications from the Reno could have been intercepted by the Delphy and contributed to the accident. In fact, the daily log shows that only three bearings were sent to the Reno on Sept. 8, all between 1100 and 1140: 286.5° at 1100; 238° at 1119; 215° at 1140. All bearings indicate that the Reno was well within range to get a definite fix, one she used to skirt the Channel Islands instead of entering the Santa Barbara Channel. 

At 1130 on Sept. 8, the Delphy was passing Pigeon Point, well out of range to intercept signals from the compass station. The Delphy did not begin requesting bearings from Point Arguello until 1415, when she came into range.
 

Newspaper: San Diego Union

Heading and Date: Admiral Coontz Assigns Inquiry Board Of Officers To Place Responsibility, September 11, 1923

Dateline: Santa Barbara, Calif., Sept. 10.

Extract 1: Story of Fatal Crash Told by Survivors of Wrecked Destroyers Who Arrived in San Diego by Train and Ship; Casualties Continued to Two Ships.
The Young turned over 90 seconds after striking and most of the men now reported missing were penned in the lower compartments with hardly a chance in the world to escape. Survivors of the Young told of hearing the despairing cries of the doomed men as the waters rose around the wrecked craft.

Author's Comments: A day after the accident, a 16-man patrol was left behind at Point Honda to search for bodies and guard the wrecks. Lt.(j.g.) C. V. Lee from the Chauncey, and Ensign William Wright from the S. P. Lee, were in charge of this detail. They remained on duty until Sept. 20, having recovered 13 bodies. Of these, two could not be identified.

A memo on Sep. 22 from Cmdr. H. E. Odell, Medical Corps, aboard the Melville, Flagship of the Commander Destroyer Squadrons, to the Chief of Staff of the Battle Fleet, stated that 13 bodies were recovered, shipped by rail, and received at the University Undertaking Parlors, San Diego, California. Of these, two were unidentified, and one whose identity was not certain: Salzer, C. A., Coxswain. A list of bodies recovered follows:

From the U.S.S. Young
Torres, Enrique, Cabin Steward
Jones, Ernest, Cabin Cook
Salzer, C. A., Coxswain (identity not certain)
Kirby, Edward C., Fireman Third Class
Van Schaak, Vern R., Fireman Third Class
Overshiner, Gordon J., Fireman Third Class
Slimak, Joseph J., Fireman Third Class
Zakrzewski, August, Fireman Second Class
Rogers,Leo F., Fireman Third Class

From the U.S.S. Delphy
Conway, James W. H., Fireman Third Class
Pearson, James T., Fireman First Class

There was only one body from the Delphy either missing or unidentified, that of Cabin Cook Sofronio Dalida. If one of the recovered, unidentified bodies was Dalida, then that leaves the Young with 8 missing and one unidentified. If neither of the two recovered unidentified bodies was Dalida, then 7 men from the Young were missing and so was the body of Dalida.

On Sep. 13, the Arizona Republic reported that Overshiner's body was recovered—and later identified by his father Edgar Overshiner from San Jose, California—from the fire room of the Young by divers who cut into the hull with torches. They also found another body which could not be identified.

After examining the ratings of the sailors whose bodies were identified, one may conclude most were Firemen and members of "the black gang" who performed duties in the lowest holds of the ship—the fire rooms—where danger from  oil-burning boilers producing highly pressurized steam prevailed. In addition, where the distance from fire room to fresh air was the greatest.

This author concludes that due to difficulties divers encountered trying to cut into the hull of the Young with torches amidst a constant, raging surf, the operation was terminated, and the Young became a tomb for the missing sailors.
 

Newspaper: San Diego Union

Heading and Date: Survivors Of Crews From 7 Destroyers Reach Home Exhausted By Experience, September 11, 1923

Dateline: Santa Barbara, Calif., Sept. 10.

Extract 1: All about us (survivors clinging to the overturned Young) were huge rocks jagged and harsh in appearance through the fog as they were lighted for a moment by a flare from one of the many carbide pots thrown overboard from the life rafts. As each wave receded, we could look down at the rocks beneath us and then the angry seas washed it again spraying us with crude oil that floated out from the ship's tanks, threatening to wash us from our insecure positions on the side.

Author's Comments: This article provides more insight to what appeared as burning oil on the surface of the water. With flares for illumination, and lit carbide pots bobbing in the water alongside struggling sailors screaming for help, one could be left with a wrong impression.

There were no burn injuries treated at either Santa Barbara Hospital or San Diego Naval Hospital. Most injuries were lacerations to the feet and hands from scaling the sharp, volcanic rocks at Point Honda.
 

Newspaper: Arizona Republic

Heading and Date: Armed Guard Fires on Sea Vandals Who Try To Loot Destroyer, September 14, 1923

Dateline: Santa Barbara, Calif., Sept. 13.

Extract 1: Two more bodies were recovered, one identified as that of Gordon J. Overshiner of San Jose, Cal. The other had not been identified tonight. Further search of the hulk (after divers cut into the hull with torches) of the Young failed to locate any additional bodies and no more efforts will be made in that direction. It is the theory at Point Honda that all bodies of victims not recovered are afloat and eventually will be washed ashore.

Author's Comments: On Sept. 10, Lt. Lee, in charge of recovering bodies at Point Honda, was quoted as saying that he will not recover any more bodies until an opening was made in the hull of the Young. Three days later, two bodies were recovered after his condition was met.

This extract contradicts previous statements in the press that there were no sailors trapped aboard the Young when she turned over. In fact, these two sailors who were found in the hull of the Young, "stuck with the ship", as ordered by Cmdr. Calhoun. One can conclude they remained on watch in the fire room while she flooded and turned over in 90 seconds. Their duty was to keep the boilers in operation until ordered otherwise, even with water poured in through her slit, starboard side and the boilers threatening to blow. No such order was given.

Overshiner and the unidentified sailor (who was probably also a Fireman) were not recommended for posthumous citations for remaining at their duty station in the fire room, ready to respond to emergency orders from the bridge, while water poured in and the ship began to turn over. The Board of Inquiry and Rear Admiral Kittelle recommended many of the survivors for citations based upon acts of courage following the accident, and as a result, numerous letters of commendation and Life Saving Medals of Honor were issued. They failed to recognize the two sailors on watch in the bowels of the Young, however, this author and the members of the Point Honda Watch do.
 

Newspaper: Arizona Republic

Heading and Date: Disregard Of Signals Gets Blame For Crash, September 19, 1923

Dateline: San Diego, Calif., Sept. 19.

Extract 1: Officer of Ill-Fated Naval Squadron Believed Radio Station in Error, Probe Board Is Told.
Dead certainty that they were right and a radio compass station on Point Arguello wrong, led navigators of Destroyer Squadron 11 to plot a change of course that hurled seven ships on the rocks off Point Honda and cost the lives of 23 enlisted men, a naval court of inquiry was told here today by Lieutenant Lawrence F. Blodgett, navigation officer of the squadron's flagship, Delphy.

The frank admission that "little weight was attached" to radio signals from Arguello  furnished the chief sensation of the hearing today and ended in the interruption of the witness' account by Admiral W. V. Pratt, presiding member of the court, long enough to name him the thirteenth defendant in the case.

Author's Comments: Prior to giving his sworn testimony as a witness, and before being named a defendant, Lt. Blodgett thought he could escape prosecution because LCdr. Hunter, skipper of the Delphy, was prepared to testify that he was the navigator on Sept. 8, and not Lt. Blodgett.

In exchange, Lt. Blodgett would protect his superiors—Capt. Watson and LCdr. Hunter—by withholding testimony that he believed the bearings from the compass station showed the Delphy too far northward and set inshore to make a turn into the Santa Barbara Channel. And that he requested the squadron slow to take soundings.

It is my opinion, that if Lt. Blodgett would have testified truthfully before the Court of Inquiry, it would have altered the outcome of the trials by General Courts-martial considerably.

Lt. Blodgett "stuck to his story" when he appeared as a prosecution witness in Capt. Watson's and LCdr. Hunter's trials. Never once did he testify that he thought a doubtful and dangerous navigational situation existed. And never once did the JAG—LCdr. Leslie Bratton—ask Lt. Blodgett directly "if he requested his superiors to slow and take soundings."

After the trials of Capt. Watson and LCdr. Hunter, Lt. Blodgett was tried and acquitted of the charge—Culpable Inefficiency in the Performance of Duty—by the same Court after an hour of deliberation. He did not take the stand to testify in his own behalf. In fact, no witnesses were called by the defense. During the trial, LCdr. Hunter testified for the prosecution that he was the navigator, not Lt. Blodgett. The JAG introduced Lt. Blodgett's testimony before the Court of Inquiry into evidence which showed that Lt. Blodgett was performing navigational duties on Sept. 8. This attempt failed to convince the Court that Lt. Blodgett was the navigator. 

Lt. Blodgett was congratulated by members of the Court following the verdict and restored to duty.

According to the National Archives in Washington, DC, Lt. Blodgett's record of trial was not turned over to the Archives by the Navy Department. It was missing from its folder. However, on Oct. 18, 2004, after over five years of diligent searching and thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, a copy of Lt. Blodgett's record of trial was received by this author from the Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Review Activity, Office of the Judge Advocate of the Navy. 
 

Newspaper: Arizona Republic

Heading and Date: Chief Of Destroyer Squadron Would Take Blame For Disaster, September 25, 1923

Dateline: San Diego, Calif., Sept. 24.

Extract 1: No Liquor Aboard
He (Capt. Watson) denied emphatically that liquor was in any way responsible for the disaster and said that if any of his officers or men had had liquor aboard their ships he must have known about it, since "destroyers are such small vessels that officers and men are thrown into closest association and one could not conceal liquor from the others."

Author's Comments: Lt. Blodgett's son, Mr. Laurence F. Blodgett, wrote me from Seattle, Washington, on Feb. 8, 2000, only months before his death on Dec. 28, 2000. In this letter, he stated his father told him a story about Point Honda, while they were hunting at Pearl Harbor—at the Ammunition Depot cane fields adjacent to the Depot—early in the morning on Dec. 7, 1941. The following extract from this letter needs to be recorded for future naval historians.

"My father [Lt. Blodgett] received total vindication by the highest court-martial (he was acquitted by a General Courts-martial) ever held in the Navy. After adjournment, a member of the court remarked that they would have changed their verdict and looked at the captains who were dropped in numbers (Capt. Watson - 150 numbers and LCdr. Hunter, skipper of the Delphy, - 100 numbers) for violations involved in the Delphy accident, but my father was a Lt. and the last to testify (during his trial), and they could not recall witnesses. This is my feeling on the Honda disaster.
Being a Lt. and the navigator of the Delphy [although LCdr. Hunter testified at his trial that he was the navigator on Sept. 8, not Lt. Blodgett], who after several calls for help to the Captain, asked him to change course, was pushed aside by the Captain and the ship proceeded onto the rocks. Never mind the designated navigator, my father, wanted to change headings which were laid out by the Captain (Watson), who had been drinking in his cabin with a guest (Eugene Dooman) smuggled on the ship in violation of the Rules."

When this author called Mrs. Rigmor Blodgett in Seattle by phone on June 24, 2002, she told me that if her husband, Mr. Laurence F. Blodgett—son of Lt. Blodgett—were still alive, he would "swear on a stack of bibles" that his father told him Capt. Watson was drinking alcohol aboard the Delphy prior to the wrecks.

During testimony at the Court of Inquiry, Capt. Watson testified that he takes full responsibility for the catastrophe that cost 23 lives, and asked that none of the blame be allowed to fall on the shoulders of his able and loyal subordinates, against whom he had no complaint to make and only words of praise to utter.

Also during testimony before the Court of Inquiry, Capt. Watson denied emphatically that liquor was in any way responsible for the disaster, and said that if any of his officers or men had had liquor aboard their ships he must have known about it, since "destroyers are such small vessels that officers and men are thrown into closest association and one could not conceal liquor from the others."

Capt. Watson did not testify about himself or Mr. Dooman—only about his officers and men. In fact, Mr. Dooman remained the illusive "Delphy's Phantom Passenger" until the late 1950s when discovered by the authors of Tragedy at Honda. In a letter to the authors, Mr. Dooman wrote that he was not called as a witness because Capt. Watson's defense counsel believed that it would damage his case.

One final comment which adds speculation on the subject of alleged alcohol consumption and the resultant behavior of Capt. Watson aboard the Delphy prior to the wrecks. A copy of a personal letter from LCdr. John M. Ashley, Eleventh District Communication Superintendent, San Diego, California, to his friend, Frenchy, on Sept. 24, 1923 was obtained from the National Archives. LCdr. Ashley probably did not realize that when he had his yeoman (RBB) type this letter, a copy would be placed in the superintendents files, and years later, find its way into the National Archives.

The letter contained two typed pages which reported LCdr. Ashley's attendance as a witness during the Court of Inquiry, and his predictions as to the outcome of the investigation, and another page and a half on personal matters. He wrote about the conduct of Radioman First Class F. H. Hamilton, who was on watch at the Point Arguello Radio Compass Station before and at the time of the accident.

"Fortunately the radioman on watch from 1600 to the end was a radioman first class, a crackerjack operator with all kinds of experience. He had his hands full, with various ships, Navy and Merchant. I also have inside dope from the Chief Radios on the Delphy (CRM L. V. Latimore and CRM C. V. Tipsword) who were old shipmates of mine here in the district. This I dare not write even in a personal letter."

CRM Latimore and CRM Tipsword testified for the defense in Capt. Watson's trial. The only noteworthy testimony was when CRM Tipsword, attached to Capt. Watson's staff, stated he recalled the radio phone conversation between Cmdr. Roper and Capt. Watson. Cmdr. Roper called and requested permission to take his division to the aid of the Cuba, aground at San Miguel. It was denied. The conversation lasted about 20 minutes, between 7 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. Nothing in either of the Chiefs' testimony could bring new light on LCdr. Ashley's statement in his personal letter to Frenchy.
 

Newspaper: Arizona Republic

Heading and Date: Honda Disaster Due To Mistake In Calculation, September 26, 1923

Dateline: San Diego, Calif., Sept. 25.

Extract 1: After hearing LCdr. Hunter's testimony at the Court of Inquiry, the author of the newspaper article arrived at a conclusion that the accident was "an error in judgment and not an act of Providence (God) that hurled seven ships to destruction and 23 men to their deaths."

The article further states that "LCdr. Hunter was being cross-examined by counsel for the other defendants and had just finished citing an unseasonable northerly current and the type of radio compass used at Point Arguello as the real causes of the destroyer disaster when he was interrupted by Admiral W. V. Pratt, senior member of the court."

"Do you mean that the wreck was an act of Providence? asked the admiral, or an error of judgment?"

"I'll have to admit that it was an error of judgment," replied the witness. Then after a long pause: "But as contributory causes, I believe the unusual northerly current we encountered near Point Arguello and the fact that a bilateral compass is used there were partly responsible."

LCdr. Hunter continued his testimony, "I think there is also a possibility that abnormal currents caused by the Japanese earthquake might have been another contributory cause, or magnetic disturbances connected with the solar eclipse affected the compass—but of these I cannot, of course, speak with any first hand knowledge."

Author's Comments: The conclusion drawn by the author/editor of the newspaper article appears not to have been based on LCdr. Hunter's testimony.

This author's conclusion is that LCdr. Hunter stated the accident was due to acts of Providence and an error of judgment. There is ample evidence that the Pacific coast around Point Honda/Point Arguello felt the effects of the Japanese earthquake.

The Great Kanto Earthquake in Japan created more than 200 aftershocks following the 7.9 main event on Sept. 1, 1923. On Sept. 2, an excess of 300 shocks were recorded, including a major event at 1147. More than 300 additional shocks followed from Sept. 3 - 5.

On Sept. 4, four days before the accident at Point Honda, the New York Times published an Associated Press (AP) article from Los Angeles  which described twenty foot waves at Los Angeles Harbor believed to have been the result of the earthquake and tidal wave which devastated parts of Japan. At Santa Barbara, the highest seas in years washed the shores for thirty-six hours. Six and eight foot waves drove bathers back on the beach, and at one time, the tide came to the sea wall at the foot of Beach Boulevard for the first time in several years.

Considering acts of Providence in the realm of the divine, this author believes unusual north easterly currents in the vicinity of Point Honda/Point Arguello—as a result of the earthquake in Japan—caused the ships of the squadron to be off course and become stranded.

In addition, considering human error, this author believes, that because LCdr. Hunter failed to respond to several bearings received from the radio compass station, which when plotted, showed the Delphy too far north to change course to 95° true, he exercised poor judgment.
 

Newspaper: The Naval Weekly

Heading and Date: "9-TURN", Complete  Narrative of the Destroyer Disaster at Honda Head, October 1923

Dateline: San Diego, Calif.

Extract 1: On the bridge of the U. S. S. Delphy, the squadron leader—LCdr. Donald Hunter, skipper of Flagship Delphy leading the formation—ordered his navigation officer (Lt. Blodgett) to take new bearings and decide on a change of course to safely pass around the point at Arguello, where the coast juts far out into the Pacific, and which, safely passed, requires a change of course to the eastward, so as to maintain the relative distance from the coast and not steam out to sea.

In several minutes the navigation officer reported back to his Captain. With the aid of the radio compass at Point Arguello, with which the radiomen were co-operating to ascertain position, the lieutenant had arrived at the decision that the squadron was still steaming some miles to the north of the Point and that a change of course to pass the light at Arguello was not yet necessary.

Author's Comments: This extract from The Naval Weekly was published after the Court of Inquiry adjourned but before the first General Courts-martial, case of Capt. Watson on Nov. 1, 1923.

Early in the hearing, Lt. Blodgett testified under oath before the Court of Inquiry that he did not believe a doubtful navigational situation existed aboard the Delphy, nor did he consider the squadron in any danger when the fatal turn was ordered, and because of this testimony, he was named a defendant and no longer a witness.

Lt. Blodgett was a prosecution witness in Capt. Watson's and LCdr. Hunter's trials by General Courts-martial. At no time, during questioning under oath by the JAG and/or the Court, did he testify that he was aware of any danger. Although, there appeared to be numerous opportunities where he could have testified that he believed a doubtful navigational situation existed. Lt. Blodgett's testimony during both trials was similar to his testimony at the Court of Inquiry.

Who contributed to The Naval Weekly about Lt. Blodgett's report that the Delphy was too far north to change course? This information would have been damaging evidence to Capt. Watson and LCdr. Hunter who were awaiting trial by General Courts-martial. It is this author's belief that Lt. Blodgett provided this information because he wanted the truth to be known after being named a defendant at the Court of Inquiry. Although he reverted back to false and misleading testimony at Capt. Watson's and LCdr. Hunter's General Courts-martial. Any viewer interested in assisting in research into this matter, please contact us at webmaster@pointhondamemorial.org.

And who were the readers/subscribers to The Naval Weekly in San Diego, home port for many ships from the Pacific Battle Fleet? The author can answer this question. San Diego was a navy town on California's southern tip in 1923, and The Naval Weekly was probably a very popular newspaper amongst naval personnel. 
 

Newspaper: New York Times

Heading and Date: Acquit Lieut. Blodgett, November 11, 1923

Dateline: San Diego, Cal., Nov. 10.

Extract 1: Navy Court Congratulates Officer of Wrecked Destroyer Delphy
Lieutenant Lawrence Blodgett, the destroyer Delphy's executive officer on the voyage from San Francisco to San Diego on Sept. 8, when seven vessels of a destroyer squadron were lost, and the third officer to face court-martial on charges of culpable inefficiency, was acquitted in findings read today after the court had deliberated an hour.

He was congratulated by members of the court following the verdict. He will be restored to duty at once.

Author's Comments: What the members of the General Courts-martial did not know was that the JAG, LCdr. Leslie Bratton, who lost Lt. Blodgett's case, would be promoted to Commander and transferred to the JAG Office in Washington, DC, in late December, to review all records of trial for the endorsement of the Secretary of the Navy, Edwin Denby. And when he accomplished this review, he recommended that the finding and acquittal in the case of Lt. Blodgett, and all others who were acquitted, be disapproved.

A letter from the JAG Officer to Lt. Blodgett on Jan. 7, 1924 stated that the Navy Department on Jan. 4, 1924, approved the proceedings, but disapproved the finding and acquittal of the General Courts-martial. It was signed by Rear Admiral J. L. Latimer, Judge Advocate General of the Navy, by direction of the Secretary of the Navy. LCdr. Bratton, the Assistant JAG of the Navy, finally won his case against Lt. Blodgett.

The end result was that Lt. Blodgett protected Capt. Watson and LCdr. Hunter from severe punishment with his testimony before the Court of Inquiry and at their General Courts-martial. Lt. Blodgett could have been ordered to stand trial for perjury, because he gave false, misleading and evasive answers before the Court of Inquiry that were designed to obstruct the legal process. And it appears that the powers to be wanted to close this incident during Secretary Denby's tenure, so no new trial was ordered.

After taking care of his superiors, Lt. Blodgett was counting on LCdr. Hunter's testimony when he went to trial. And his acquittal by the members of the same General Courts-martial was due to LCdr. Hunter's persistence that he was the navigator aboard the Delphy on Sept. 8. Lt. Blodgett did not take the stand to testify during his trial.

 Back to Top of Page

Magazine Articles

 Introduction

My research reveals that seven magazine articles were published about the Point Honda accident, which occurred on September 8, 1923. The first was in January 1957—thirty-four years after the accident. Five articles were published after 1973, and most show evidence of new discoveries as a result of the Freedom of Information Act.

The following table lists the magazines which published articles on the Point Honda accident. Extracts from these magazines and comments by this author are included on this web page.

 

It is my intent to repeat facts in Author's Comments whenever necessary to convey the best possible explanation of an extract. Because of the textual length of this page, a viewer may choose to read the extracts from only one or two magazines. If this is the case, repetition will be justified. One who reads every extract and comment, in every magazine article, will encounter this repetition and it may be boring. Kindly consider my purpose and read on.

Send your comments, suggestions and complaints to:

 webmaster@pointhondamemorial.org 
 

Magazine: U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

Title and Date: Course Zero Nine Five, January 1957

Author: Lieutenant Commander Richard B. Hadaway, U.S. Naval Reserve

Extract 1: On the previous Sunday, Sept. 2, 1923, the headlines in most papers read, "Tokyo and Yokohama Wiped out by Earthquake, Fire, Typhoon, and Tidal Wave Saturday Morning." Almost at once, the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey noticed abnormal fluctuations of currents and tides on the Pacific Coast, but in the time available there was no way of predicting their set and drift, or how long they would last. That they were evidently strong and contrary to the established current was the misfortune of the Cuba's Second Officer. 

The Cuba, a steamer owned by the Pacific Mail Line, went aground off Point Bennett, on San Miguel Island, near the Santa Barbara Channel, shortly after 0400, on Sept. 8. Although she was a total wreck, no lives were lost.

Author's Comments: The Great Kanto Earthquake in Japan created more than 200 aftershocks following the 7.9 main event on Sept. 1, 1923. On Sept. 2, an excess of 300 shocks were recorded, including a major event at 1147. More than 300 additional shocks followed from Sept. 3 - 5.

On Sept. 4, four days before the accident at Point Honda, the New York Times published an Associated Press (AP) article from Los Angeles  which described twenty foot waves at Los Angeles Harbor believed to have been the result of the earthquake and tidal wave which devastated parts of Japan. At Santa Barbara, the highest seas in years washed the shores for thirty-six hours. Six and eight foot waves drove bathers back on the beach, and at one time, the tide came to the sea wall at the foot of Beach Boulevard for the first time in several years.

This author believes that unusual north easterly currents in the vicinity of Point Honda—as a result of the earthquake in Japan—caused the ships of the squadron to be off course and become stranded.

LCdr. Donald Hunter, skipper and navigator aboard the Delphy on Sept. 8, did not trust the bearings from the new-fangled, Radio Compass Station at Point Arguello, which when plotted, showed his ship to be set into shore approximately 8 1/2 miles in less than two hours. LCdr. Hunter also disregarded the request of Lt.(j.g.) Lawrence F. Blodgett, Executive Officer and Head of the Navigation Department, to slow down from 20 knots and take soundings.

Lt. Blodgett may have sent a radio message requesting LCdr. Bratton, skipper of the Stoddert—one of the ships in Division 32 in the rear of the column—to obtain a bearing, since his radio operators were having difficulty making contact with the station. The Stoddert received two bearings: one at 2011 - 326° and another at 2032 - 330°. The Delphy intercepted the 326° bearing, and it was called up the tube to LCdr. Hunter on the bridge. LCdr. Hunter did not believe it was correct, although when plotted, it showed the Delphy to be heading straight for the Radio Compass Station. 

With no concern for unusual currents, and being committed to his dead reckoning position because his required 2000 radio report to the Commander Destroyer Squadrons, Rear Admiral Kittelle aboard the Melville, was based on it, LCdr. Hunter presented the navigational situation to the squadron commander, Captain Edward H. Watson. He told Capt. Watson that his dead reckoning position was correct and that the bearings from Point Arguello were wrong. He also told him that at 2035, after he requested a reciprocal bearing, the station sent 168°, which when plotted, showed the Delphy to be south of Point Arguello, but she was actually 11 1/2 miles and 7° true from her dead reckoning position.

That  bearing alone should have triggered a doubtful navigational situation in the minds of experienced navigators such as Capt. Watson and LCdr. Hunter, to be followed by orders to slow and take soundings. However, that did not occur, because at about 2050 on Sept. 8, Lt. Blodgett's request was disregarded. Capt. Watson ordered a change of course to 95° true at 2100 for entry into the Santa Barbara Channel—and a continuation of the speed run, still at 20 knots.

Extract 2: Between 1848 and 2035 radio traffic in connection with the stranded Cuba was heavy, and no bearings were received (by the Delphy). Consequently, the 2000 position of the flagship (Delphy) was a D. R. (dead reckoning) position run forward from the last fix at Pigeon Point at 1130.

Author's Comments: The daily log from the Radio Compass Station at Point Arguello for Sept. 8, 1923 shows that traffic was normal. No radio traffic was generated by the Cuba because its transmitter was out of order.

Radioman First Class F. H. Hamilton, on watch at the compass station, made an entry in the log which states that "A8C (Delphy) causing interference by not listening in before transmitting." This entry was posted sometime between 1852 and 1907. The daily log also shows that at 1933 the compass station called the Delphy but did not get a reply.

Three radio operators from the Delphy were sea sick, so the remaining two-some stood all watches. There is no way to know if these operators were fully trained in communications procedures and Morse Code.

The requested reciprocal bearing received by the Delphy at 2035 of 168° does not appear in the daily log of the compass station.  However, the Kennedy, one of the ships in the 32nd Division at the rear of the column, intercepted and logged the bearing.

There were no bearings requested by or sent to the Delphy between 1848 and 2035, although the Stoddert, another ship in the 32nd Division, requested and received two bearings during that time: 2011 - 326° and 2032 - 330°. Another indication that traffic was not heavy. Only that the Delphy was not requesting bearings.

The skipper of the Stoddert, LCdr. Leslie Bratton, was later appointed the Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) for the Court of Inquiry and General Courts-martial. He was transferred to Washington after the trials to review the records for the Secretary of the Navy. In my opinion, LCdr. Bratton should have been a material witness because he possessed relevant information about the accident, and therefore, should have declined the JAG appointments. 

The 2011 bearing of 326° was intercepted by the Delphy and logged at 2012. LCdr. Hunter dismissed it as incorrect. He was committed to his 2000 report of his location based on dead reckoning, and this bearing was a contradiction. The 326° bearing showed the Delphy set in shore by 8 1/2 miles and heading straight for the compass station.

Extract 3: Captain T. T. Craven, defense counsel for Capt. Watson, wrote that "It seems most remarkable that in all the group of vessels no one mind could have sensed the danger, and that not a single question should have been asked which might have indicated to others and to the Squadron Commander an uncertainty which would have awakened a realization of the possibility that the course was hazardous. No such inquiry was made."

Author's Comments: The secret that Capt. Watson, LCdr. Hunter and Lt. Blodgett kept to themselves was not shared with Capt. Craven. While on the Delphy's bridge in the presence of his superiors, Lt. Blodgett requested the squadron slow and to take soundings, because he believed that a dangerous situation existed. His request was denied because Capt. Watson did not want to spoil the 20-knot engineering run to San Diego. This contradicts Capt. Craven's statement.

Lt. Blodgett testified as a prosecution witness in Capt. Watson's and LCdr. Hunter's trials. Under questioning by the JAG, Lt. Blodgett stuck to the testimony he gave at the Court of Inquiry, that he never suspected a dangerous situation during the squadron's voyage southward. But during his trial, Lt. Blodgett relied upon LCdr. Hunter to testify that he performed the navigation aboard the Delphy on Sept. 8, not Lt. Blodgett.  Lt. Blodgett did not take the stand to testify during his trial, in fact, no witnesses were called by the defense. Lt. Blodgett was acquitted of the charge and ordered to return to duty aboard the Melville.

In Dec. 1923, LCdr. Bratton was promoted to Commander and transferred to the JAG Office in Washington to serve as the Assistant JAG of the Navy. His duty was to review the records of trial from the Point Honda accident for Secretary Edwin Denby's endorsement. Lt. Blodgett's record was reviewed by Commander Bratton with a recommendation that the finding and acquittal be disapproved. The JAG of the Navy, Rear Admiral J. L. Latimer, signed the endorsement by direction of the Secretary of the Navy on Jan. 7, 1924. Similar action was taken on all officers who were acquitted.

When the Navy Department records from the JAG Office in Washington were turned over to the National Archives, Lt. Blodgett's record of trial was missing from the files. A charge-out card was in the folder—where the record of trial should have been—indicating it was checked out and not returned. There was no date or signature on the charge-out card.

Commander W. G. Roper, commanding Division 32 at the rear of the column aboard the Kennedy, knew the Delphy was on a course heading toward the Radio Compass Station at Point Arguello. He thought they would turn westward, out to sea, as soon as they obtained a definite fix either by seeing the light or hearing the horn. Commander Roper, and all other division commanders and ship captains, did not know Capt. Watson intended to turn into the Santa Barbara Channel. In fact, Capt. Watson made this decision known to LCdr. Hunter around 2050, only about ten minutes before the actual turn to 95° true.

Commander Roper chose to slow then stop his division after receiving the order by radio phone to take a 95° course on reaching the squadron's turning point. It is not known if he had time to call the Delphy and warn them of the danger. However, in the late 1950s, Commander Roper's Officer of Deck (OOD), then Ensign Samuel Dalkowitz, stated that the bawling out Commander Roper received f